It's a Mad, Mad, Mad, Mad, Mad World!

Politico points out the irony of all ironies today---President Obama's Afghan Strategy is being heavily criticized by Dick Cheney Darth Vader on the right and Edward R. Murrow Keith Olbermann on the left.

My head hurts...make it stop!

Have you no Perspective!?

Over at Politico's Arena today lots of folks are taking their turn at Vice President Cheney's remarks on Afghanistan. Most of them appear to be academics and more than a few Democratic political types...folks you would commonly refer to as 'operatives' in some cases. Regardless of the labels, the outrage is palpable.

Meanwhile, the contrast between conservative criticism of President Obama's cautious decision-making on Afghanistan and the Democrat's criticism of the previous Administration's handling of...well, everything...is, ironically, on display for all to see (at least at this writing) on Politico's home page where Rep. Maurice Hinchey accuses President Bush of purposefully allowing Osama Bin Laden to escape Tora Bora:

Rep. Maurice Hinchey (D-N.Y.) on Monday accused former President George W. Bush of “intentionally” letting Osama bin Laden escape during the American invasion of Afghanistan.

“Look what happened with regard to our invasion into Afghanistan, how we apparently intentionally let bin Laden get away,” Hinchey said during an interview on MSNBC.

“That was done by the previous administration because they knew very well that if they would capture al Qaeda, there would be no justification for an invasion in Iraq,” the Democratic congressman continued. “There’s no question that the leader of the military operations of the U.S. called back our military, called them back from going after the head of al Qaeda.”

When host David Shuster followed up to ask if Hinchey really thought Bush “deliberately let Osama bin Laden get away,” the congressman responded: “Yes, I do.”

Rory Cooper of the Heritage Foundation rightly exposes the contrast between Democrat reaction to President Bush (even now, having been gone long enough to have had a third child) and Cheney's criticism of President Obama's decision-making process and it's consequences for the military forces already in Aghanistan.

Read the criticisms of Cheney and agree if you like. But don't let the differences between his comments and the 8 years of Bush-rants escape you.

It's the Rules of Engagement, Stupid!

More from TM on Afghanistan:

The WaPo discusses the ghastly short-term political implications of McChrystal's emphasis on protecting the Afghan population rather than our own forces:

Less Peril for Civilians, but More for Troops As U.S. Toll in Afghanistan Rises, Lawmakers And Families Are Questioning New Restrictions

Concern is rising in Congress and among military families over a sharp increase in U.S. troop deaths in Afghanistan at a time when senior military officials acknowledge that American service members are facing greater risks under a new strategy that emphasizes protecting Afghan civilians.

...McChrystal, in a major assessment disclosed by The Washington Post on Monday, castigated the U.S. military in Afghanistan for being "preoccupied with protection of our own forces." He wrote that U.S. and other military personnel must minimize their time in armored vehicles and walled bases and "share risk, at least equally, with the people." McChrystal also called for coalition troops to "radically increase" joint operations with Afghan forces. Both steps, he said, mean greater risk for coalition troops in the near term but could "ultimately save lives in the long run."

The problem is, the long run is a series of short runs, and sometimes you can't get there from here.

If we had strong public support for the effort in Afghanistan, or a President inclined to use his rhetorical gifts to rally some, a strategy that literally trades more deaths today for the prospect of fewer deaths down the road might be sustainable. Bush managed a similar feat (and sans the rhetorical gifts) with the surge in Iraq, which projected a short term increase in deaths with the new mission of population protection coupled with new Rues of Engagement. But as Obama would say with pride, he isn't George Bush.

Like I said before, fight the war to win or don't bother.

Rules of Engagement (Or, How we Turned a Fighting Chance to Win the War in Afghanistan into a Sure-fire Way to Lose)

Tom Maguire writes a post today that threatens to make me sick to my stomach. In Rules of Engagement, he relays the following via McClatchy Newspapers:

...four Marines died in an ambush in Afghanistan.

The four Marines were part of a US training group attached to a larger Afghan unit. The team (60 Afghan soldiers, 20 border police officers, 13 Marine and U.S. Army trainers and Mr. Landay) had arranged to meet with some village elders, but the meeting was apparently tipped to the Taliban, who prepared a deadly welcome.

In addition to the betrayal by either the village elders or the Afghan security forces, the Marines were let down by the new US rules of engagement meant to reduce civilian casualties:

U.S. commanders, citing new rules to avoid civilian casualties, rejected repeated calls to unleash artillery rounds at attackers dug into the slopes and tree lines — despite being told repeatedly that they weren't near the village.

Helicopters that were supposed to be available on five minutes notice took an hour to arrive.

New ROE kept US forces from engaging the Talibani ambush in a way that would have ensured it's defeat and contributed to the death of 4 US Marines. The fact that the Taliban knew the force was coming is a bigger question that of course must be addressed but is one I'm not focused on.

In 2007 while we all debated the Surge in Iraq, I first came to recognize the self-limiting nature of US Rules of Engagement thanks to the contributions at Captain's Journal. Herschel Smith succinctly summarized the negative effect the then-current ROE's were having. The problem was two-fold.

Not only were there not enough forces in place to provide the security we wanted and the country needed, the ROE's under which forces were acting kept them from engaging insurgents and Al-Qaeda in any meaningful way that would further our strategic goals. I see a glimpse of something similar in this situation.

I've never accepted the parallels that some have drawn between Vietnam and Iraq and I certainly don't agree that there are any between Vietnam and Afghanistan in the larger sense. Maybe between the Soviet occupation and our current situation (though Fred Kagan goes a long way to debunking that notion here) but most definitely no to any thought that Afghanistan must ultimately end like Vietnam did.

However, adopting ROE's that do nothing to further your strategic objectives, that are so focused on creating no collateral damage--worthy in and of itself--that your own forces are exposed to greater risks is counter-productive. Wars must be fought to be won or there is no reason to fight them.

What wasn't splattered all over CNN and the NYT

Britain's Telegraph reports the latest on the 'reformulating, reconstituting' Taliban in Afghanistan:

The Taliban's much-vaunted spring offensive has stalled apparently due to lack of organisation after dozens of middle-ranking commanders were killed by British troops in the past year, according to military sources. The death last week of the key Taliban leader Mullah Dadullah at the hands of American special forces has harmed the Taliban's morale to the point that local commanders are having to tell their troops to "remain professional" despite the loss. After suffering more than 1,000 dead in battles with the Parachute Regiment and Royal Marines in the last year, the Taliban retired to regroup and re-equip last winter. A spring offensive was ordered by the Taliban leadership based in Quetta, Pakistan, and was meant to be launched in late March. But a lack of mid-level commanders has meant that there has been little co-ordination to bring about the offensive. "They are getting strategic guidance from Quetta but this is not translating on the ground," a military source said. "It's a bit premature to discuss the Taliban as a spent force. I believe that they are struggling but still maintain a capability to carry out attacks on a daily basis. But I would suggest in the long term the Taliban may just peter out."

Now doesn't this jibe with the argument I advanced with two posts in the last year on the subject of increased violence resulting from an ISAF offensive rather than a resurgent Taliban? Why is no one reporting that the ISAF (read: British, American and Dutch) efforts have been successful in decapitating the Taliban and apparently degrading 10% of the fighters they claimed they were putting in the field? Wouldn't this be considered progress? Why haven't the major outlets reported the good news from Helmland?