One Good Option?

Critics of the Bush administration have maintained for sometime both that the President is intent on taking direct military action against Iran and that such an act is ill-advised at best and potentially disastrous at worst. For critics on the left, such action would be essentially par for the course--yet another bad choice in a long line of bad choices and poorly run adventures. For some of us on the right, such action represents, not a first-and-best option but rather something potentially required out of necessity.

Author and history professor Arthur Herman examines this situation from a slightly different angle than most in his current piece at Commentary. While most other assessments of the situation in the Gulf pertaining to Iran's behavior focus near-solely on the race for nuclear weapons, Herman points out that Iran is already a formidable force in the region in conventional terms. From there he points to one military option that is limited, very precise in it's targeting and perhaps one of the only good options available to the US, Europe and even Asian nations with vital interests in the Persian Gulf.

The key to the whole operation is the point that isn't but should be obvious to all: for all Tehran's bluster about shutting off the flow of Oil, that spigot runs both ways and if oil isn't flowing out of Iran, gasoline and most importantly, currency, isn't flowing into the country and it's economy is in mortal danger:

Every country in Western Europe and Asia, including those that complain most bitterly about American policy in the Middle East, depends on the steady maintenance of the global economic order that runs on Middle Eastern oil.

But--and herein lies a fruitful irony--so does Iran itself. Almost 90 percent of the mullahs' oil assets are located either in or near the Gulf. So is the nuclear reactor that Russia is building for Iran at Bushehr. Virtually every Iranian well or production platform depends on access to the Gulf if Iran's oil is to reach buyers. Hence, the same Straits by means of which Iran intends to lever itself into a position of global power present the West with its own point of leverage to reduce Iran's power--and to keep it reduced for at least as long as the country's political institutions remain unprepared to enter the modern world.

And there it is that the stage is set for a conventional operation that, hypothetically successful, threatens the current regime with removal from inside:

The first step would be to make it clear that the United States will tolerate no action by any state that endangers the international flow of commerce in the Straits of Hormuz. Signaling our determination to back up this statement with force would be a deployment in the Gulf of Oman of minesweepers, a carrier strike group's guided-missile destroyers, an Aegis-class cruiser, and anti-submarine assets, with the rest of the carrier group remaining in the Indian Ocean. The U.S. Navy could also deploy UAV's (unmanned air vehicles) and submarines to keep watch above and below against any Iranian missile threat to our flotilla.

Our next step would be to declare a halt to all shipments of Iranian oil while guaranteeing the safety of tankers carrying non-Iranian oil and the platforms of other Gulf states. We would then guarantee this guarantee by launching a comprehensive air campaign aimed at destroying Iran's air-defense system, its air-force bases and communications systems, and finally its missile sites along the Gulf coast. At that point the attack could move to include Iran's nuclear facilities' not only the "hard" sites but also infrastructure like bridges and tunnels in order to prevent the shifting of critical materials from one to site to another.

Above all, the air attack would concentrate on Iran's gasoline refineries. It is still insufficiently appreciated that Iran, a huge oil exporter, imports nearly 40 percent of its gasoline from foreign sources, including the Gulf states. With its refineries gone and its storage facilities destroyed, Iran's cars, trucks, buses, planes, tanks, and other military hardware would run dry in a matter of weeks or even days. This alone would render impossible any major countermoves by the Iranian army. (For its part, the Iranian navy is aging and decrepit, and its biggest asset, three Russian-made Kilo-class submarines, should and could be destroyed before leaving port.)

The scenario would not end here. With the systematic reduction of Iran's capacity to respond, an amphibious force of Marines and special-operations forces could seize key Iranian oil assets in the Gulf, the most important of which is a series of 100 offshore wells and platforms built on Iran's continental shelf. North and South Pars offshore fields, which represent the future of Iran's oil and natural-gas industry, could also be seized, while Kargh Island at the far western edge of the Persian Gulf, whose terminus pumps the oil from Iran's most mature and copiously producing fields (Ahwaz, Marun, and Gachsaran, among others), could be rendered virtually useless. By the time the campaign was over, the United States military would be in a position to control the flow of Iranian oil at the flick of a switch.

I can hear the critics now--"Cmon, we were told Iraq would be easy too." Well, while extreme skepticism I suppose is warranted, Herman supports the premise with one important historical example involving the same nations in the same region:

An operational fantasy? Not in the least. The United States did all this once before, in the incident I have already alluded to. In 1986-88, as the Iran-Iraq war threatened to spill over into the Gulf and interrupt vital oil traffic, the United States Navy stepped in, organizing convoys and re-flagging ships to protect them against vengeful Iranian attacks. When the Iranians tried to seize the offensive, U.S. vessels sank one Iranian frigate, crippled another, and destroyed several patrol boats. Teams of SEALS also shelled and seized Iranian oil platforms. The entire operation, the largest naval engagement since World War II, not only secured the Gulf; it also compelled Iraq and Iran to wind down their almost decade-long war. Although we made mistakes, including most grievously the accidental shooting-down of a civilian Iranian airliner, killing everyone on board, the world economic order was saved--the most important international obligation the United States faced then and faces today.

As I said, many of us on the right aren't exactly dreaming about such a scenario. We do though, depending on who you're talking to, think it perhaps is unavoidable. If and when the time comes, something like what Herman proposes here might be the best approach.

The beauty of the proposal is it's precision. By focusing exclusively on Iran's largest strategic vulnerability, it assures with success a forced change. Could the mullahs truly withstand the ramifications of Iran's oil operations choking on their crude and the economic ripples it caused throughout the country? Given recent events and just Thursday's news of hardliner's clashes with reformers is it so outlandish to believe the answer to the question is, No?

Herman presses the point in closing: That the regime in Tehran is indeed hated, and also radically unstable, is a point on which both advocates and opponents of American action can agree. In this connection, it is important to bear in mind that Iran is rent by ethnic divisions and rivalries almost as fierce as those that divide Iraq or such former Soviet republics as Georgia and Russia itself. Almost half of Iran's population is made up of Kurds, Baluchis, Azeris, Arabs, and Turkomans. Unlike the Persians, who are Shiites, most of these minorities are Sunni. Thus, Iran is a country ripe for constitutional overhaul, if not re-federation. Unless the current regime and its backers are willing to change course, decisive military action could open the way for an entirely new Iran.

The key word is "decisive." What has cost us prestige in the Middle East and around the world is not our 2003 invasion of Iraq but our lack of a clear record of success in its aftermath. Governments in and around the Persian Gulf region are waiting for someone to deal effectively and summarily with the Iranian menace. Saudis, Jordanians, Egyptians, and others--all feel the pinch of an encroaching power. The longer we wait, the harder it will be to stop the Iranian advance.

Is this the best military option for Iran? I don't know and if I had to wager I'd guess even the Pentagon isn't sold on there being a 'best' option. Is it a good option? Herman's approach gives a good chance at fulfilling the objective of hurting Iran's multi-faceted efforts in the Middle East with a decent likelihood of success while minimizing the potential for greater damage and escalation into something nobody wants.

Stick it on a list of already not-so-great options and it begins to look pretty good.