The Legacy of Saddam's Hanging

The weekend's news of Saddam's death was greeted by this observer with a mental toast to the victory of good over evil. There is no denying the cosmic justice of this outcome.

But as the news of the circumstances surrounding the tyrant's execution began to emerge along with cell phone video, etc. I began to develop an all-too-familiar, unsettling feeling about the whole thing. In reading Belgravia Dispatch today, these feelings began to congeal and I suddenly recognized why it all felt so eerily familiar: we've gone and done it again. We've botched the unbotchable. In carrying out a positive mission, we've managed to fumble away the political goodwill that rightfully should accrue to the United States.

Gregory Djerejian thoughtfully writes:

Adnan Pachachi, speaking of Saddam's execution: “Either it’s terrible incompetence or it’s an act of revenge--a vendetta." Well, no, it was both Mr. Pachachi. It was terrible incompetence by the American overseers (is anyone surprised, after all, this was a Bush 43 supervised event?). And, too, it gave more the appearance of an act of revenge/vendetta than application of deliberate justice (see the guards chanting praise to Moktada al Sadr moments before Saddam was hung). Put simply, another major setback to Iraqi national reconciliation, it would appear, not to mention the U.S. national interest. As I recently wrote, this trial should have taken place in The Hague, or the U.S. should have better strived to recreate a more South African style Truth and Reconciliation Commission in tandem with the Iraqi authorities (yes, I know, this last easier said than done given the revanchist spirit among Iraq's Shi'a, especially post-Samarra mosque bombing, but that's yet another reason to have convened a properly constituted international tribunal where the proceedings wouldn't reek of victor's justice). Instead, as Glenn Greenwald aptly quips, "we can't even get a hanging right." Yes, this latest blunder frustrates immensely, with the grainy cell phone video footage of a vigilante-style execution in dark, dungeon-looking surroundings causing yet another body blow to America's repute in the (non-Kuwaiti) Arab world (can someone please dispense with the sad joke that is Karen Hughes' supposed stewardship of her public diplomacy outfit, for where is the damage control after Condi Rice's description of cluster munitions littering southern Lebanon as constituting the "birth pangs" of a New Middle East, or now, Hughes' silence after this latest fiasco?). But, in fairness, there is another grim reality here too, which is that spiraling events are overtaking us in Iraq at breakneck speed (while POTUS inexcusably dithers: "It's my job to listen to a lot of opinions and come up with a strategy that says we have a plan"). Much like the Iranian "diplomats" we handed back (apprehended at one of Mr. 80% Solution Abdul Aziz Hakim's complexes, reportedly specifically at Hadi al-Ameri's house, a leader of the Badr Organization, Hakim's militia!) because Maliki's government so insisted (though realistically we had little choice in the matter, all told), we were similarly barely able to exert control over the execution process, having apparently to fight to persuade Maliki's government to allow Saddam to be buried near his hometown, for instance, rather than in an unmarked grave.

It is this last point that I hope to elaborate upon in coming posts. Had I been an active blogger at the time the ISG Report came out, I would have passionately argued this very notion:

The Baker Commission was; for all intents and puposes, Tet.

No matter what this President now does or how he hopes to do it, Iraq is over for the United States. Rightly or wrongly. Bush no longer has the ability to meaningfully shape events on the ground. Surge the troops. Withdraw the troops. In the cities, or out. Take the offensive or hand things over to the Iraqis. None of it matters within the context of American objectives anymore because Bush no longer has the confidence of the American people, the support of a Democratic Congress, the international partners that could lend credibility to course corrections, the margin for error with the media and precious little control over the Maliki government. As the execution of Saddam underscores, we couldn't even influence the government to carry out this sentence in manner that would minimize sectarian passions, lend credibility to the act itself or serve as any sort of first step in healing the wounds which divide this country. The lesson and the advice from this corner is to find the cleanest, most responsible exit strategy, execute it flawlessly and hope for the best. We're done.