The Pattern

The Washington Post today ran this “blockbuster” piece from Joby Warrick. Ed Morrisey digs deep and has an analysis of his own:

So where's the issue? It turns out that the minority report was the correct analysis after all, of course, but at the time Bush spoke it was just that -- a minority report. To put it in advertising terms, two out of three inspectors agreed that the trailers were part of Saddam's WMD effort. The Pentagon relied on that majority opinion, as did the administration, and no one can argue that doing so constituted either an intent to deceive or even an unreasonable decision at the time.

No one can argue that, of course, but the Post and the media in general. Instead of simply reporting that the Pentagon didn't have consensus on this issue and that the minority report wound up being the most accurate, Joby Warrick turns the story into a Geraldo Rivera my-life-is-actually-in-danger type of journalism that substitutes cheap sensationalism for accuracy. Prior to informing the readers of the existence of two separate analyses that contradicted the report supplied by the leakers, Warrick enthralls us with a paragraph stating how none of the leakers will identify themselves for fear of retribution and a colorful epithet that the leakers considered the trailers "sand toilet[s]".

There’s more, but for my money that’s the center of the universe on this issue. In my experience debating the left about the “non-existent” WMD’s, a discussion of conflicting analysis is inevitable.

In this case, the DIA team differed from the preliminary CIA report on these trailers. In other situations, the State Department differed with CIA and so on. In any such circumstance, left-leaners nearly always reach one conclusion:

The fact that a dissenting opinion exists is proof enough that the Administration's take was wrong. Not only wrong, but illegitimate and only reachable with an agenda of war in Iraq.

When you look at the many incorrect interpretations of data on Iraq, you do indeed see a pattern in the Administration's judgment; they nearly always took the worst-case. Many times, such as with the bio-labs, a preponderance of available evidence made it appear that such was the prudent choice.

To most, if not all, on the left that I've been (un)fortunate enough to discuss this with, that is the taking-off point for the most tried-and-true criticism of President Bush on Iraq, that he lied.

To believe that however, one must assign motives that aren't clear and, up to now--if ever they will be--proven. I hear the words of the President, I hear the explanations and I take him at his word that he was viewing the situation through new prism, one that put 9/11 in the backdrop of every discussion, every contemplation of national security risks. Maybe it's just because I do as well.

But we know many on the left don't buy that either.