Non-smoking Guns

Just seem to lack the same oomph as their smoking counterparts. "Hearsay thrice removed," as James Robbins calls it.

Much to the glee of the usual suspects, the Downing Street Meme-o™ appears to be gaining escape velocity here in the US, though it was first published in it's current form a month ago in Britain and in it's first incarnation, three years ago!

You don't have to be an expert analyst to understand the fundamental flaw in trying to turn the memo into a meme-o.™ It's one man's impressions of another man's report of his own impressions of what he thought cabinet-level members of the Bush Administration were thinking.

Any analysis of this must start there, and Robbins is right in calling it "Hearsay thrice removed." The money-quote on this point gets straight at the point: By the time the Downing Street Memo was written overt action against Iraq was being widely discussed, spurred in part by the July 5, 2002, publication of some of the war plans in the New York Times. (A previous version had been leaked in May by the Los Angeles Times.) The July 5 article led to rampant speculation about the inevitability of war, especially in Britain, and whomever Dearlove and Foreign Secretary Jack Straw were talking to then may well have been reflecting this mood. Moreover, either Dearlove or Straw, or one of their staff, may well have been the "Whitehall source" for the Observer piece two days before the cabinet meeting in question. Either that or they read it in the paper and repeated it at the meeting. My question: Had they ever spoken to the president to get his views first-person?

Believing that the memo is somehow "proof" of something brings the left back to where they started when they state that Bush wanted war with Saddam before he took office; suddenly they're inside his head without ever actually trying to find out what was...well, in his head. And they say there is no such thing as ESP...strike one!

Robbins mentions war plans, as in a) how war plans were tipped by the NY Times in '02 and b) that existence of war-planning is proof that war is imminent. The latter point is the one of real interest, as it is completely illogical.

The canard goes something like this: There were plans in place for removing Saddam. You don't make war plans if you're not going to war, so obviously Bush intended to go to war before 9/11! Wrong on so many levels.

As Robbins points out: Contingency planning for military operations against Iraq had begun as early as November 2001. This is no secret; the full timeline along with a wealth of details can be found in General Tommy Franks's memoir American Solider[sic]. The plan that became known as OPLAN 1003V began to be put together in earnest in January 2002. The existence of war planning does not in itself prove that the use of force was inevitable. The purpose was to provide the president with the full range of credible alternatives for pursuing U.S. policy vis-a-vis Saddam Hussein's regime.

Buried in the National Archives are contingency plans that detail war strategies involving action against the Soviets in Europe and Asia. Can anybody point me to any direct conflict between the super-powers along those lines? Of course not, because it didn't happen.

"The existence of war planning does not in itself prove that the use of force was inevitable." A historically accurate point, as applicable to Iraq as it is to Cold War history. Strike two!

Lastly, but certainly not least, Robbins tackles the re-stating of the left's favorite anti-Bush meme: Bush lied! The meme-o™ no better proves this point than it does either of the first two discussed above.

Here Robbins' points need little clarification beyond emphasis: Dearlove's comments include the intriguing passage noted above, "Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy." To the president's critics, the meaning is clear-- the WMD intelligence was being faked to support the rationale for intervention.

This passage needs some clarification. Maybe Rycroft or Dearlove could elaborate; by "fixed around" did they mean that intelligence was being falsified or that intelligence and information were being gathered to support the policy? There is nothing wrong with the latter-- it is the purpose of the intelligence community to provide the information decision-makers need, and the marshal their resources accordingly.

But if Dearlove meant the former, he should be called upon to substantiate his charge. It can be weighed against the exhaustive investigation by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on prewar intelligence assessments in Iraq. The committee examined this very question, whether the White House had pressured the intelligence community to reach predetermined conclusions supporting the case for war. The investigation found no evidence that "administration officials attempted to coerce, influence or pressure analysts to change their judgments related to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities" or that "the Vice President's visits to the Central Intelligence Agency were attempts to pressure analysts, were perceived as intended to pressure analysts by those who participated in the briefings on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs, or did pressure analysts to change their assessments." One would think that the Senate investigation would have somewhat more weight than the secondhand impressions of a foreign intelligence officer, but if Mr. Dearlove is able to elaborate, one hopes he will.

The memo itself notes that the British assumed that Saddam had limited WMD capabilities-- and the September 24, 2002, British white paper on the topic spelled out exactly what Whitehall believed to be the facts.

Dearlove's silence--to date--is deafening. If there's more to the story, a greater clarification is owed the publics of both Britain and the United States on the subject.

As to fixing facts around the policy, his point is obvious. When presenting a case for something one compiles the best arguments available. Of course then the public arguments would not give much heed to dissenting views of the state of Iraq's WMDs.

If in fact then the implication is that the intel case was fabricated, 2 Congressional investigations have yet to uncover proof of such. The memo adds nothing to that argument. Strike three, and you are out!

The section of the memo dealing with strategic planning, yes, that was worth keeping close hold on. But the speculations about the inner workings of the American government? Sounds like the same things one could have heard on any newscast. Looking at the document in context it is hard to see what the commotion is about. Most of what might be thought sensational has already been written about elsewhere, to little fanfare. The charge of intelligence fraud (if it is such a charge) has already been investigated and found baseless. And the allegations that the president had already decided to go to war and was thus deceiving the American people are personal opinions based on unsubstantiated impressions from unnamed sources.

And that, as they say, is that.