These Boots (On the Ground) Are Made for Walkin

My position on George W. Bush's foreign policy has been that I basically approve of his strategy, but have some serious problems with how that strategy has been implemented. Diplomatically, his administration has not been sincere or adroit enough to achieve stated policy objectives. The slightest bit more attention to diplomacy could have garnered more support for the invasion of Iraq and on a panoply of other international issues. Our gray-area policies on torture and rendition have become a PR nightmare which have proven counterproductive to our stated objective of spreading democracy and will serve as fodder for terrorist recruitment and anti-americanism for years to come. At a time when the spread of democratic ideals is our #1 foreign policy objective, Abu Ghraib, Qu'ran desecration, Gitmo and rendition have allowed the international debate to evolve into a discussion of our hypocrisy rather than a celebration of our values.

And of course, the issue of post-war planning in Iraq is the subject of much controversy. I happen to believe that an awful lot went right when it came to post-war planning. There were no mass-starvations or -migrations. No environmental disasters. Minimal sabotage of oil pipelines. Very few SCUD attacks on neighboring countries. No flooding of the Tigris or Euphrates.

But it is also clear that not enough was done to secure potential WMD sites (ostensibly the reason we went to war). Massive looting of, well everything, eroded an already-degraded Iraqi infrastructure and made reconstruction far more difficult and costly. And of course, the instability spawned by the surprisingly unanticipated insurgency has precluded the secure environment needed to engender solid political and economic development in Iraq. And some measure of success on those two pillars is what will be required to bring our troops home. Until that day, our men and women will continue to carry out their tasks with bullseyes on their backs and the physical and emotional burdens to them and their families will remain tremendous. This is to say nothing of the economic and political costs to our nation as a whole.

To what can we primarily attribute these failures? A lack of boots on the ground. Andrew Sullivan shares the latest proof point with a link to this article:

U.S. Army officers in the badland deserts of northwest Iraq, near the Syrian border, say they don't have enough troops to hold the ground they take from insurgents in this transit point for weapons, money and foreign fighters. From last October to the end of April, there were about 400 soldiers from the 25th Infantry Division patrolling the northwest region, which covers about 10,000 square miles. "Resources are everything in combat . . . there's no way 400 people can cover that much ground," said Maj. John Wilwerding, of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, which is responsible for the northwest tract that includes Tal Afar. "Because there weren't enough troops on the ground to do what you needed to do, the (insurgency) was able to get a toehold." said Wilwerding, 37, of Chaska, Minn. During the past two months, Army commanders, trying to pacify the area, have had to move in some 4,000 Iraqi soldiers; about 2,000 more are on the way. About 3,500 troops from the 3rd ACR took control of the area this month, but officers said they were still understaffed for the mission. "There's simply not enough forces here," said a high-ranking U.S. Army officer with knowledge of the 3rd ACR. "There are not enough to do anything right; everybody's got their finger in a dike."

With recent reports of sweeps along the Syrian border yielding some success in stemming the flow of munitions and jihadists as background, one wonders why only 400 troops were guarding 10,000 sqare miles of real estate bordering one of the pre-eminent exporters of international terrorism in the first place. Why was this not a priority? I'm no military expert, but Iraqi border integrity seemed to me to be a major objective from the outset. Just as sealing off al Qaeda escape routes into Pakistan seemed to me to be a very high priority during the Tora Bora campaign in Afghanistan. Why were these no-brainers not no-brainers for Pentagon planners?

I assume that they were. After all, these folks understand the risks far better than I. But on some level, and I assume the civilian leadership level, insufficient troop levels were approved. Perhaps this was driven by Donald Rumsfeld's "transformation" vision, in which smaller, more flexible and technically advanced US forces are emphasized over large troop footprints. Perhaps it was driven by a political calculation in which the Administration felt that there would be insufficient public support for the invasion if half a million US soldiers were in Iraq. And perhaps it was driven by a certain degree of sensitivity to being viewed as occupiers by the Iraqis themselves. More likely, it was a combination of all three.

However, it seems clear to me that insufficient boots on the ground has resulted in the worst possible outcome: unsecured borders which sustain the insurgency, mass looting and resultant infrastructure degradation, and a general level of insecurity that is retarding political and economic development and consequently leading to more Iraqi and American deaths. While I don't believe the situation is hopeless and I believe that progress has been made, the failure to commit a larger force has really put the entirety of the effort in serious jeopardy. And unfortunately, the clock is ticking. While invading Iraq and ousting Saddam was the proper strategic decision, its implementation in the form of insufficient troop levels represents a poor tactical one. The responsibility for this situation ultimately rests with our civilian leadership. And the buck stops with the Commander in Chief, George W. Bush.