Not on purpose

Peggy Noonan wrote about the new Woodward tome yesteray and inadvertently expresses one idea as to how and why the Bush Administration thought what it did about Iraq:

Here I add something I have been thinking about the past year. It is about the young guys at the table in the Reagan era. The young, mid-level guys who came to Washington in the Reagan years were always at the table in the meeting with the career State Department guy. And the man from State, timid in all ways except bureaucratic warfare, was always going "Ooh, aah, you can't do that, the Soviet Union is so big, Galbraith told us how strong their economy is, the Sandinistas have the passionate support of the people, there's nothing we can do, stop with your evil empire and your Grenada invasion, it's needlessly aggressive!" Those guys from State--they were almost always wrong. Their caution was timorousness, their prudence a way to evade responsibility. The young Reagan guys at the table grew up to be the heavyweights of the Bush era. They walked into the White House knowing who'd been wrong at the table 20 years before. And so when State and others came in and said, "The intelligence doesn't support it, we see no WMDs," the Bush men knew who not to believe.

History is human.

It is what it is and you can choose to rail and rant and rave about it, or you can choose to acknowledge the wrong and understand why and how it happened. I understand that the latter is far less satisfying than the first, but I've always wondered how much the former accomplishes.