The forgotten gem

Michael Ledeen focuses on a point made in the Silbermann-Robb report on intelligence. It's a point that isn't often made but ought to be.

The good things are very good, and the very best thing is that they recognize that intelligence is more an art than a science, and they therefore rightly insist that the success or failure of the intelligence community will ultimately depend on the quality of the people and how they are treated. I can’t remember the last time that was said in a public document, or even in the mounting pile of commentary on the report, and it’s really the most important thing. Silberman/Robb say it, say it often, and try to figure out how best to do it. They recognize that the culture of the community is rotten — the results speak for themselves, after all — and they suggest ways to retain talented people, ranging from attractive side benefits like travel, sabbaticals, and greater opportunities to mix with the outside intellectual world.

A second time, for emphasis: ...and the very best thing is that they recognize that intelligence is more an art than a science, and they therefore rightly insist that the success or failure of the intelligence community will ultimately depend on the quality of the people and how they are treated.

This understanding accounts for much. It explains how analysts can look at the same data sets and reach different conclusions. It explains why the history of Sadaam Hussein's obfuscation and deceit mattered when analyzing the state of his WMD programs.

It is something the absolutists who continue to make the simple-argument that WMD weren't there would do well to remember as they rage on about how President Bush lied.